The essay aims at comparing differences in patterns of parliamentary recruitment for federal legislatures in Latin American countries. Those patterns as well as the political performance of state delegations were analyzed from the viewpoint of levels of stability in the control of seats. The Chilean House of Representatives is the case presenting the highest level of stable political careers in a context of moderate political turnover.. By contrast, Mexico and Argentina present high rates of political turnover among elected representatives, a condition facilitating the access of politicians lacking previous experience at the federal sphere of politics. Brazil is a intermediary case, displaying long periods of high rates of turnover, followed by reversals of such trend, as it occurs since 1998. When changes in the composition of party representation in federal legislatures resulting from voter's behavior are discarded, one may conclude that, with the exception of Chile, the high rates of political turnover are only marginally connected with electoral variations among the competing parties. Intra-party politics determining strategies for choosing and promoting candidates appear to be the most relevant variable explaining rates of parliamentary turnover.
INTRODUCTION
Which relevance is there in the study of recruitment for the Houses of Representatives? One may raise the issue from another perspective, that is, does the knowledge of variations in the composition of state and party delegations -rates of turnover, identification of short or long careers, levels of expertise in the legislative process -increase our ability to understand and explain the dynamics of political representation? Beginning with Shugart and Carey (1992) , the study of legislatures in Latin American countries became a reliable source of data supporting interpretations concerning the consolidation of new -and some not so new -poliarchies in the region. The predominance of the executive over the legislative branch of government is a feature well established by most scholars who detect, in accepted political practices prerogatives of executive authorities not granted by the respective national constitutions (Shugart and Carey, 1992) . They also point out to aspects of the political process denoting such predominance: the power of agenda secured by the president, magnified by the problems of coordination among elected representatives (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999) ; the relationship between presidential majority and presidential iniatives in legislation (Polina, Weldon and Lopez, 2000) ; the pattern of reactive behavior common to legislatures vis-à-vis the federal government (Cox and Morgenstern, 2002) .
According to the institutionalist approach the way institutions are shaped affect the behavior of members. Given this assumption what data on political turnover and on patterns of political careers tell about the working of Latin American poliarchies? The issue may be approached from two different perspectives.
From one viewpoint it is reasonable to assume the connection between stabler political institutions, such as the House of Representatives, and incentives for stabler political careers, less defections and smaller turnover rates in scheduled elections. This trend is confirmed by long-run electoral results in western poliarchies. High turnover rates in those cases are exceptional and the trend to stability resumes in subsequent elections (Blondel, 1973, Best and Cotta, 2000) .
High turnover rates were a common feature in American politics till the end of the 19 th century, connected to high levels of social and geographical mobility. From this moment onwards declining numbers of first mandate representatives became the dominant trend, with few exceptions, such as the 37% turnover registered in 1933. From 1950 till the beginning of the 1990s the turnover rate varied around 16% (Polsby, 1968 , Buckley, 1999 . The 1994 election for Congress brought along a high number of freshmen, that is, 14 Democrats and 73
Republicans. However, the total represented only 20% of the new House (Fenno, 1997 , Aldrich and Rohde, 1997 , Jacobson, 2000 . The same pattern may be found in France, where high rates of political turnover are related to political crises. According to Gaxie (1993:85) High turnover occurred again in 1958 when ¾ of the seats were occupied by new representatives.
However, many of them were not new to party politics: some had previously competed in elections or had held public offices at the local administration level (Gaïti, 1999) . In 1981 the Socialists were the majority in the National Assembly and the turnover rate was even higher, that is, 41,9%. But also in this case research on the personal data of the elected show that most of them had already a political career (maire, conseiller général, conseiller municipal) . Once again the turnover was exceptional and had opened access to national politics to old hands in politics.
Political recruitment for the German Bundestag show a consistent downward longitudinal trend in turnover rates. From the high of 40% registered in the first two legislatures elected after the establishment of the Federal Republic (1949 and 1953) , the numbers are 31% for 1957 down to the low of 21% in 1987. In 1990 the turnover rate of 35% may be explained by the commotion of the national unification. From 1994 onwards the turnover rates resumed the trend of low variation (Wessels, 1997) .
The same stabilization trend may be found in parliaments of southern European countries. As expected, higher turnover rates were registered in the first two elections under democratic rules.
They reached 50% to 60% in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. However stabilization trends settle after the third election and stabler careers become a common feature of the political system (Liebert and Cotta, 1990, Morlino, 1992) .
From another perspective and contrasting with the trend of lower rates of political turnover and stabler political careers, it is plausible to assume that, given a constitutional design restrictive to parliamentary initiatives in legislation, control over the government and political intermediation, the incentives to stable representative careers become jeopardized. The result may be intermittent careers and higher rates of political turnover. This may have happened in Brazil, according to Fabiano dos . He stresses the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution of 1988 upon congressional scope of action, comparing it with the Constitution of 1946, and assumes that the changes adversely affected the patterns of political recruitment for the House of Representatives, that is, the rates of political turnover become higher and abler politicians are not keen on keeping the conquered seats.
Following this kind of argument one should not minimize the importance of feedback, that is, restrictions on legislative initiative and action and on the role of parliament as a sphere of political intermediation impose limits on individual efforts to building a stable political career; political recruitment may become a hazardous process, involving higher costs of obtaining and transmitting information needed to generate institutional loyalty and efficient coordination of political processes.
Awareness of this kind of problem may have inspired Norris's comment: institutional approach have also paid little attention to the motivation and experience of candidates (1997:09) . Polsby (1968) and later Putnam (1976) stressed the connection between political turnover and professionalization of parliamentary representation. High rates of political turnover may have a positive effect on innovation and flexibility of political representation. But they may also difficult the consolidation of political leadership and the acquisition of legislative knowledge needed to ensure efficiency in specialized branches of legislation. As a side feature of this kind of problem Schepsle (1978) 
POLITICAL TURNOVER
Rates of turnover registered in every election is a basic variable in the study of parliamentary recruitment. The turnover rate denotes the number of first mandate elected representatives for the House of Representatives. It should be pointed out that research on this variable does not require comparing one legislature with the previous one. The approach here adopted is a non-sequential analysis of electoral results. This methodological procedure does not prevent taking into account the return of politicians who already have a previous political career albeit interrupted at the national level for a given length of time. The substitutes were not considered even when they occupied the seat during the legislature under study. 1997:35) . Some relevant elements in this calculation are: the public criticism of opinions held by the politician which may reflect on the vote, lack of financial support, loss of personal purpose for performing the role of member of parliament.
Research focusing on the American House of Representatives pointed out that electoral uncertainty is a very strong reason for political retirement. The mathematical formula developed by Black (1972) summarized this hypothesis: U= P(Bw) + (1-P) (B1) -C. It is thus interpreted: the utility of competing is the result of the probability of winning (P), the gain derived from keeping the seat (Bw) compared to the gain of other activity available in case of defeat (B1), minus the cost of competing for reelection. The variation of Bw and C is the decisive element in the decision to compete. Fenno (1973) stressed the same sort of calculation to explain the decision to retire from electoral competition: uncertain victory and the opinion that one's priorities for the legislative agenda will not prevail. Moore and Hibbing (1998) when criticism of the Fourth Republic and of gaullist politics among the electorate allowed for significant political turnover. In the polarized climate of opinion, and forseeing predictable defeat, many of the grands noms voluntarily retired, a development that has not received enough attention in the study of the period (Birnbaum, 1977; Gaxie, 1993) .
Later and also quite revealing is the circumstance of the 1994 national elections in Italy, when the partitocrazia collapsed (Guzzini, 1994) . The traditional party system was then imploded, the electorate displaying strong disapproval of politicians denounced as criminals and generally avowing deep mistrust of political institutions. The end result was the sweeping redesign of the party system, the traditional Christian-Democrats becoming the Popular Party, the Socialist Party reduced to a very small political association, all these changes accompanied by the amazing electoral growth of new political groups such as the Forza Italia. The extensive political realignment caused, as expected, high rates of parliamentary turnover. In the 1994/96 elections the turnover rate reached 70%, a major change comparing to the rate varying around 35% registered since 1953 (Briquet, 1999; Bartolini and D'Alimonte, 1995 The data reveal that 49% of members of parliament in 1994 competed for reelection, a lower rate than the 65% in 1987 and 54% in 1992. Only 21% of those who competed for reelection returned to the House of Representatives. The distribution of the retirement rate is uneven, affecting more severely the Christian -Democrats (63%) and less the Communists (34,6%). Only 12% of PPI candidates to reelection were elected, a worse result than the overall counting for the Italian Left (sinistros).
We turn now to the chosen Latin American countries. The time span covers elections held after the return to democratic regimes. For Chile and Argentina the study includes all elections held for the national parliament; for Brazil and Mexico, since the electoral calendar was respected during the authoritarian regimes, the time span is lengthier, beginning in the second half of the 1980s, when electoral competition among parties increased.
Taking stable poliarchies as a guiding reference, it is assumed that routinization of democratic procedures in new poliarchies should lead to diminishing rates of political turnover and to incentives to stabler parliamentary careers. Available data for the countries under study indicate variation in the expected pattern (Table 6 ).
The closest reproduction of the conventional pattern of recruitment is found in Chile. As expected, the turnover rate is high after 16 years without elections and regular congressional life. But beginning with the second legislature it fell consistently, the dominant trend being a high level of political return to the seat in the following election. Mexico and Argentina are the opposite cases.
The high turnover rates in Mexico are easier to explain: in 1933 a constitutional provision forbade consecutive reelection for the national and provincial Houses of Representatives. The prohibition applies also to different forms of representation -majority or proportional and also to the position of substitute.The result of this rule is that turnover is total, that is, each legislature is entirely new in terms of membership. The cost of keeping party loyalty during the interim period explains the low rate of return in subsequent legislatures (Carbonell, 2000) .
The case of Argentina calls for finer analysis. The turnover rates are lower than the Mexican ones, but the constitutional and electoral rules were designed to prevent this kind of political variation. 1985, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2001) . 
PARTY CONTRASTS IN PARLIAMENTARY TURNOVER
The study of parliamentary turnover based only on statistical data do not allow for assessing differences in party behavior that might be relevant in explaining the phenomenon. One of the issues to be addressed from this perspective may be thus summed up: does parliamentary turnover derive from practices in the political recruitment, adopted by the parties which control seats or is it a outcome of electoral realignments which affects the choice of voters and increases the chances of victory for political newcomers?
Jacobson (2000) unbalanced variation between the number of seats controlled by the party and the number of freshmen who get elected in one given election; 3) the loss of seats which alter the structure of opportunities for veterans and novices.
Statistical control of the effect connected to variation in the number of party seats in every legislature is possible by establishing the ratio between nominal turnover and the actual number of seats secured by each party.
When the flat rate of turnover is considered (REN), one may find that the Chilean political parties follow the same trend of diminishing numbers of freshmen in their delegations ( Table 7) Indication for reelection is higher among members of conservative parties (UDI, RN), as well the probability of electoral success ( Figure I ). The practice of indicating incumbent representatives for reelection is also common among leftist parties and the Christian Democrats, albeit less ingrained as it is among conservatives. It should be pointed out though that only a small number of Christian Democrats is reelected.
2 This kind of problem may be lessened when agggregate data are used. There may be increases in the overall number of seats but it seldom happens. One may recall the 1987 addition of 100 seats to the Mexican House of Representatives (the event was not considered in the present research) or the 1994 addition of 10 seats to the Brazilian Congress.In the Brazilian instance if all the new seats were occupied by freshmen the overall impact on the rate of political turnover would be marginal, only 2 points in a rate varying around 55% and 60%.
The data on political recruitment in Argentina show that in 2001 all parties were affected by high rates of political turnover due to inter-party volatility (Table 8) Until 1994 high rates of parliamentary turnover were common to all parties in Brazil, the highest numbers affecting PT, PDT and PTB (Table 9 ). The increase registered in 1994 may be due to electoral realignments, connected with the ongoing expansion of the vote in PT and the localized growth of PSDB's political weight. In 1998 this pattern is altered. The rates of parliamentary turnover clearly diminish among the elected delegations of PPB and PSDB and at a lower pace of PFL and PT. The turnover rate for PSDB would have been smaller but for the increase in the number of seats in competition. In the case of PT, variations in electoral behavior appear to be a variable explaining parliamentary turnover less decisive than intra-party competition in the composition of lists of candidates. The rates of political turnover for PMDB and PDT are stabler.
However, due to decreasing in the number of seats they muster, the chances of following a stable career in the House of Representatives also decrease.
Electoral results in Mexico throughout the 1990s reveal a continuing declining trend of PRI, the steady strengthening of PAN, with a remarkable victory in 2000, when the party won the presidency, and the rise followed by decline of PRD. However the overall parliamentary turnover is not explained by changes in party preferences among the electorate (Table 10 ). The single most important cause of the phenomenon is the constitutional provision forbidding consecutive reelection. The politician may return to the House of Representatives after a three-year interim period, but occupying offices in other branches of the government is the strategic option to pursue a stable political career. Until 2000 PRI was the dominant party in control of the national government. It should be then expected higher rates of reelection among its members. From this perspective, comparing the median time span required for the return to the office of representative reveal a higher duration for PRI (5,7 years) and a faster pace for candidates of PRD (4,8 years) and PAN (3,6 years). Albeit the turnover rate in PRI be smaller than the ones registered in the other parties, the chances for any single priista to be part of a list for reelection is low. It is quite probable that the continuing reduction in the number of PRI seats in the House of Representatives gave way to tougher internal competition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Assuming that professionalising political careers in the legislative branch of government requires some amount of stability in the composition of lists of candidates, one may find important differences in the structure of political opportunities among the four Latin American countries under study. The lowest rate of political turnover is found in Chile, thus stimulating stabler parliamentary careers. Mexico and Argentina present the highest rates, thus offering greater opportunity for access to politicians lacking previous career in the national House of
Representatives. Brazil stands in the middle, with a long history of high rates of political turnover followed by the recent lowering trend, beginning in 1998.
Given the idiosyncrasies of all possible institutional arrangements which may turn out to be a real puzzle for the researcher, it is a difficult task to determine the effective causes explaining the The Mexican case offers the opportunity of comparing electoral results based on majority and proportional formulae, under stable political institutions (Table 11 ). Taking into account that political return is a rare event, it is possible to calculate its probability according different electoral principles. For the members of the then governing party PRI the electoral principle did not alter the established rate of probability of returning to the House of Representatives. For members of opposition parties, the nominal indication to the list of candidates actually remained the only chance of reelection. Besides the known restrictions connected to the majority rule, the prohibition of consecutive reelection and the lack of access to offices in the executive branch of governement make the chances of victory in uninominal electoral competitions very low for candidates of opposition parties. Norris (1997) Distribution of seats among parties (%) -Brazil P a r tie s 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 1 
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